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Abstract
Ecological and sensorimotor theories of perception build on the notion of action-
dependent invariants as the basic structures underlying perceptual capacities. In this
paper we contrast the assumptions these theories make on the nature of perceptual
information modulated by action. By focusing on the question, how movement specifies
perceptual information, we show that ecological and sensorimotor theories endorse
substantially different views about the role of action in perception. In particular we
argue that ecological invariants are characterized with reference to transformations
produced in the sensory array by movement: such invariants are transformation-
specific but do not imply motor specificity. In contrast, sensorimotor theories assume
that perceptual invariants are intrinsically tied to specific movements. We show that
this difference leads to different empirical predictions and we submit that the
distinction between motor dependence and motor specificity needs further
clarification in order to provide a more constrained account of action/perception
relations.
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21 Blurring the boundary between action and perception
The idea that action and perception are not two independent cognitive domains and
that perception is constitutively shaped by action has been an important research
trend in the last decades. The study of active perception, or those mechanisms that
allow organisms to negotiate perceptual problems by processing sensory stimulation
on the basis of action, has become a thriving area of investigation in neuroscientific,
psychological and computational research on perception, witness the number of
reviews and theoretical analyses that have addressed this trend (Thelen & Smith,
1994; Port & Van Gelder, 1995; Hurley, 1998; Berthoz, 2000; Findlay & Gilchrist
2003).
The idea of perception as action-dependent has been particularly emphasized by
motor theories of perception, i.e. those approaches claiming that perceptual content
depends in an essential way on the joint contribution of sensory and motor
determinations (Sheerer, 1984). According to motor theories, perceptual systems are
able to discriminate between reafference (sensory input resulting from self-motion) and
exafference (sensory input produced by external events) in virtue of their relation to
efference (internal information elicited by self-motion). Perceptual systems receive at
the same time reafference and efferent copies generated by a given movement and
such information is used to perceive a specific action as self-initiated. Over time, the
organism learns to establish correlations (supposedly stable and systematic for a given
organism in a given environment) between reafference and efference (Gallistel, 1980).
The capacity to discriminate between exafference and reafference underlies, according
to motor theories of perception, several perceptual distinctions (e.g. self-motion vs.
motion in or of the environment) and constancies (e.g. position constancy, see Stark
& Bridgeman, 1983; Duhamel et al., 1992).
Motor theories of perception represent a liberal view of action/perception
relations, to the extent that they admit that perceptual capacities can depend on
sensorimotor relations on top of purely sensory information (Hurley, 2001). They are
mildly liberal, though, insofar as they limit the contribution of action to perception to
those perceptual processes that underlie the control of motor behavior. This is
consistent with the established view that part of the human perceptual system, geared
towards action control and spatial behavior, draws on dedicated processes that are
functionally independent from those targeted at perceptual categorization and
recognition (Milner & Goodale, 1995; Jacob & Jeannerod 2003). But can action-
dependent perceptual processing extend beyond what seems to be its natural domain,
i.e. perception for motor control and spatial behavior? Can action modulate a broader
range of perceptual processes than mainstream perceptual theories assume? Does the
perception of properties of the environment (independent on the agent’s body
configuration or movement) rely on action-dependent information? This is a much
stronger claim of action dependence in perception and an issue we aim to tackle in
this paper.
A number of research programs have taken a more radical stance on
action/perception relations, claiming that action is pervasive in the functioning of
perceptual systems. The role of action in perception, they suggest, extends beyond
processes targeted at the control of motor behavior and some aspects of perceptual
3performance intrinsically depend on the contribution of action.
Claiming that perception is intrinsically active, inseparable from action or
even—as some have argued—reducible to a form of action (Noë 2004), is a
controversial hypothesis raising different orders of questions.
At a conceptual level, this hypothesis questions the traditional distinction between
perception and action as independent cognitive domains. A lively debate has
addressed this claim, and several lines of criticism have been leveled against the claim
that perception cannot occur without action (Jacob, 2006; Prinz, 2006). Not
surprisingly, more attention has been paid to the theoretical implications of these
radical approaches than to the consequences of implementing a radical approach as an
empirical research program.
From an empirical perspective, radical approaches on action/perception relations
raise an interesting, often understated question. If part of perception is action-
dependent, what processes and structures can be invoked to explain how perceptual
systems parse and select sensory information on the basis of action? The answer that
these theories seem to suggest is that perceptual systems process action-dependent
perceptual invariants, or patterns of perceptual information that are intrinsically
action-dependent.
In this paper our aim is not to address the question whether action and perception
can be considered as mutually independent or to argue in favor or against radical
approaches. The goal of our analysis is to articulate the very idea that perception may
rely on action-dependent invariants and to contrast the way in which such a notion is
characterized in these radical approaches. We propose that an analysis of this notion
is a more promising testbed to assess the prospects of radical approaches to
action/perception as genuine empirical programs than a generic criticism of some of
their (possibly flawed) background assumptions.
1.1 Radical approaches to action/perception relations
The most prominent theories that take a radical view of the contribution of action to
perceptual processes are those that belong to the ecological approach to perception
(Gibson, 1979; Cutting, 1986; Reed, 1996). The ecological approach emphasizes the
constitutively active nature of perceptual abilities, and the fact that perceptually
relevant information is revealed by active interaction of the observer with the
environment. A review of the ecological tradition is beyond the scope of the present
analysis. Here we focus on ecological theories as a case of radical view on
action/perception relations in order to analyze the notion of perceptual information
they endorse.
The contrast class that we consider in this paper is a family of research programs
that, although not organized into a unified theoretical framework, share a strong
interactivist assumption about the nature of perception. We refer to this class of
programs as the sensorimotor approach to perception. The sensorimotor approach puts a
strong emphasis on the fact that the basic structures underpinning perceptual skills are
couplings between an organism’s movements and co-occurring changes in sensory
stimulation. In this sense, sensorimotor approaches are a radicalization of classical
motor theories of perception insofar as they emphasize the pervasiveness o f
information about self-initiated movement in perceptual processes beyond those
4targeted at the control of motor behavior.
Although this assumption is not yet articulated into a full-fledged empirical
paradigm (such as the ecological approach to perception), a long tradition supports
the idea that sensorimotor couplings are key to the understanding of perceptual
phenomena. The first explicit acknowledgement of the role of sensorimotor invariants
to understand perception can be traced back to Helmholtz, who suggested that:
[w]hen we perceive before us the objects distributed in space, this perception is the
acknowledgement of a lawlike connection between our movements and the therewith
occurring sensations [. . .]. What we perceive directly is only this law (Helmholtz,
1878/1977, p.138-139)
Sensorimotricity is a core notion in enactive theories, which take cognition as a
capacity resulting from the self-organization of living systems and from the
constraints imposed on this activity by the interaction with the external environment
(Järvilehto, 1999; Varela, 1979; Maturana & Varela, 1980; Varela et al., 1991). In the
field of neurophysiology, some authors defended the idea that perception reduces to
the ability of encoding patterns of covariation between motor patterns and co-
occurring sensory stimulation (MacKay 1962, 1987).  Building on inspiration that can
be traced back to Poincaré (1902), sensorimotricity as the ability to process systematic
couplings between sensory and motor information has also been regarded as
constitutive to the acquisition of space perception (Philipona et al. 2003; Wolff,
2004). A sensorimotor hypothesis has been recently applied to the study of color
categorization, showing that several psychophysical aspects of color perception can be
predicted by looking at how invariants in properties of reflecting surfaces are encoded
by the perceptual system of an agent actively exploring its environment (Philipona &
O’Regan, 2006). Finally, and more controversially, sensorimotricity has also been
proposed as a key to the explanation of the phenomenal character of visual experience
and visual consciousness (O’Regan & Noë, 2001).
Ecological and sensorimotor approaches have often been conflated or considered
variations on the same theory (Scholl & Simons, 2001; Pylyshyn, 2001) insofar as
they share an important number of background assumptions, in particular:
A. The claim that many traditional problems in perceptual theory not taking into
account the contribution of action (e.g. stimulus disambiguation, inverse
optics problems, perceptual binding), are ill-posed;
B. The idea that perceptually relevant patterns of the sensory stimulation are
those selected through motion and that static sensory patterns (e.g. properties
of the retinal image) are irrelevant to functionally characterize perception;
C. The claim that perceiving does not require possessing detailed internal
representations of the external environment;
D. The focus on the intrinsically active nature of perception and the role of the
action-perception loops;
These similarities have often been taken as arguments in support of a substantial
theoretical continuity between ecological and sensorimotor approaches as opposed to
mainstream perceptual theories.1 Defendants of a sensorimotor approach have
                                                
1 See the debate hosted at http://www.interdisciplines.org/enaction
5described their divergence from Gibsonian theories as a mere matter of “explanatory
focus” and denied any major theoretical discontinuity between the two approaches
(Noë, 2002):
In adopting this view we invoke the role of action and the importance of extracting
invariants, and so we are indebted to Gibson. But we harness these ideas for quite
different explanatory and theoretical purposes. In other words, whereas Gibson stresses
the use of sensorimotor invariants as sources of information, we are stressing the idea that
sensorimotor invariants are part of what constitute sensations and perceptual content. We
show that Gibson’s idea can go farther than Gibson pushed it (O’Regan & Noë, 2001, p.
1019).
Similarly, defendants of the ecological approach to perception tend to present their
theories as an articulation of the enactive approach to perception, fully compatible
with a sensorimotor approach (Stoffregen & Bardy, 2004; Stoffregen et al., 2006). In
spite of the large number of shared background assumptions, the continuity between
these approaches has been challenged by other authors (Varela, 1991; Hurley, 2001).
What this debate has failed to appreciate is the difference in the specific
constraints that these theories put on perceptual information modulated by action.
The thesis we defend in the present work is that of a substantial divergence between
ecological and sensorimotor approaches to perception: this divergence may not be
explicit at a broad theoretical level, but—we argue—underpins specific predictions
made by these theories on how action modulates perception.
Our argument is two-folded. On the one hand, we will contrast ecological and
sensorimotor approaches to perception by looking at the way in which they
characterize the notion action-dependent information. On the other hand, we will
argue that, because of their different characterization of perceptual invariants, these
approaches make different empirical predictions about movement-mediated
perceptual skills and about perceptual information and processes underpinning such
skills. We conclude that this distinction between different notions of invariant is
crucial to frame any empirical research program on the functional role action plays in
perception.
2 Framing the concept of action-dependent invariants
The radical nature of ecological and sensorimotor approaches to perception does not
simply consist in the claim that perception must be studied by looking at the
interaction between a goal-directed, active organism and its environment.2 A much
stronger claim they make is that information grounding perceptual abilities is itself
action-dependent. In this sense, referring to modulations of perception through
action requires formulating explicit hypotheses on how movement affects perceptual
information. In this section, we review the characterizations of the notion of action-
dependent invariants that can be found in the ecological and sensorimotor literature
and we show to what extent they diverge.
2.1 Ecological invariants
                                                
2 See section 2.4 below.
6An informal characterization of the notion of a perceptual invariant can be found
in J. Gibson’s seminal work (Gibson, 1959; 1960). By providing a plethora of
examples of perceptual structures that can be extracted in action/perception couplings,
Gibson offers a sort of extensional characterization of what an action-dependent
perceptual invariant may be. The lack of an explicit characterization of what
constitutes action-dependent perceptual information has been one of the most
criticized aspects of Gibson’s theory of perception (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1981) and later
defendants of the ecological approach to perception have tried to spell out this notion
in more precise terms.
A more accurate characterization can be found in Michaels & Carello (1981) who
provide a number of definitions of perceptual invariants. In particular, they
distinguish between structural invariants and transformational invariants. On the one
hand, structural invariants are defined as those properties of the sensory stimulation
that remain constant through motor interaction, even though other properties may
vary: as such they determine classes of equivalence that allow distinct perceptual
objects to be regarded as the same under this respect. On the other hand,
transformational invariants can be characterized as “modes of change” of perceptual
objects, i.e. invariant dynamics of sensory stimulation produced by specific
transformations on these objects. We might rephrase this by saying that structural
invariants are those properties that allow perceptual systems to parse structural
components of the environment, whereas transformational invariants allow perceptual
systems to detect and track dynamic regularities to which structural components obey.
 The distinction between structural and transformational invariants has been
criticized by other exponents of the ecological approach (see for instance Cutting, cit.,
p. 67)3. However, a common feature of all these characterizations, that remains
faithful to a Gibsonian view, is the idea that invariants are patterns in sensory
information that are revealed when an organism engages in motor interaction with
the environment, or:
structures that remain invariant despite certain transformations caused by the animal and
that therefore might serve to specify persisting environmental resources (Reed, cit., p. 48).
Let us try to put this notion of invariant in the context of the general assumptions of
ecological theories of perception. The ecological approach defends the idea that there
is a nomological relation between specific states of the agent-environment system and
invariant properties of the proximal stimulation they produce on the sensory organs of
the perceiver. It is in virtue of this nomological relation—described by the laws of
ecological optics, acoustics, haptics… (Gibson, 1979)—that invariants “specify” or carry
reliable information about the states of the agent-environment system they refer to.
This relation of specification in virtue of ecological laws is the tenet of ecological
accounts of perception:
                                                
3 Cutting  (cit.) proposes the following characterization of an optical invariant: “To be an optic
invariant, all information about an object or event must be present in the optic array, measurable at a
particular place and time, and valid to all places and times. Thus the invariant is a constant mapping
from the proximal image and the distant stimulus, where relations between image (or eye) and stimulus
are not fixed” (p. 75).
7[i]n ecological optics we typically assume that the information (the invariant) specifies the
object or event perceived; that is, we pick up (process) the invariant, and as a result
perceive the object properties specified (Cutting, cit., p. 71)
Ecological theories assume that perceptual systems are geared to these proximal
invariants insofar as their “pickup” enables the perception of the states of the agent-
environment system.4 More precisely, the ecological approach postulates that
perceptual systems rely on information provided by so-called “ambient energetic
arrays” (Gibson, 1979). By hypothesis, these energetic arrays provide information that
is rich enough to specify all relevant properties of the agent-environment system and
to perceptually control behavior.5 In particular, the ambient array contains multimodal
sensory invariants that the agent can rely upon to perceive its body configuration and
movements (proprioception), the relation between itself and the environment, for
instance in order to determine its position or motion direction (exproprioception), as
well as to perceive properties of the external environment (exteroception).
All of these proximal invariants are made available through motor interaction.
Since a transformation is needed to reveal the invariant, the availability of perceptual
information necessarily requires action, as a condition to submit the sensory
stimulation to the appropriate transformations. In this hypothesis lies one of the
radical claims ecological theories make with respect to motor action: action is a
necessary requirement to obtain perceptually relevant information, and no perceptual
ability can occur if invariants specified by action are not available. To clarify the
notion of perceptual invariant in the ecological approach, let us review two classical
examples.
A first classical example of perceptual invariant revealed through motor
transformations is the so-called cross ratio, a visual invariant specifying rigidity.6
[INSERT FIGURE 1]
Figure 1: The geometric definition of cross ratio.
Two fundamental properties of the cross ratio need to be emphasized. First, cross
ratios are invariant under all rotations and translations of line L2, translations of line
L1 and of point X. Second, it can be proved that cross ratio invariance is preserved
whatever the shape of the projection surface (L1) is. The invariance of cross ratio
                                                
4  See for instance Lee (1976) in the case of vision and Turvey (1996) for the dynamic touch.
5 As Warren (2006b) characterize it, “[ i]nformation consists of  patterns of stimulation at the receptors
that are specific to the  ecological state of affairs and are therefore useful in controlling  action”
(p.367).
6 As Cutting explains it: Let A, B, C, D be four points on the same straight line (L1). Let X be a point
not on that line, and connect all point to X. This creates the new lines of which AX, BX, CX and DX
are segments. Let line L2 intersect these new lines at points A’, B’, C’ and D’. Projective geometry
tells us that the cross ratios of segments bounded by the points ABCD and A’B’C’D’ are the same. In
particular, the following segments lengths form the following equal ratios:
(AD_BC)/(AC_BD) = (A’D’_B’C’)/(A’C’_B’D’)
This cross ratio – the product of the longest segment AD and the inner segment BC divided by the
product of the segments connecting non-adjacent exterior and interior pairs of points (AC and BD) –
is invariant under any projection to any point not aligned with A through D (Cutting, cit., p. 81).
8under several transformations affecting its geometrical projection makes it a good
candidate—from an ecological perspective—as a perceptual invariant. Cross ratios can
be taken as information that perceptually specifies object rigidity in our environment.7
In this sense, cross ratio is a paradigmatic example of a geometric invariant that
remains unchanged throughout transformation in the proximal sensory stimulation of
an observer and that bears a reliable informative relation with a property of the distal
environment.
A second paradigmatic example of invariant addressed in the ecological literature
is motion parallax, i.e. the optical pattern produced by the relative movement of an
observer with respect to objects in the visual environment (Gibson, 1950). When an
observer moves in space, the resulting displacement of the point of fixation generates
different motion of pairs of points in its visual stimulation due to the different
distance of distal objects from the fixation point.
[INSERT FIGURE 2]
Figure 2: Motion parallax. As the eye moves from left to right,
closer points move faster than further points
Motion parallax can be analyzed in terms of several differential invariants: divergence,
curl and deformation (Koenderink 1975, 1986).8 It has been shown that these
invariants provide reliable perceptual information about the spatial structure of the
stimulus, and provide in particular reliable information for depth perception.
Accordingly, a large number of empirical studies have explored humans’ capacity to
perceive depth (including objects three-dimensional shape) by relying uniquely on
motion parallax, a process called structure-from-motion (Rogers & Graham, 1979;
Ono et al. 1986; Steinbach et al. 1991; Ujike & Ono, 2001; Nawrot, 2003). It has
been shown in particular that humans can use motion parallax to perceive depth in
passive conditions involving object motion (the “kinetic effect”, see Wallach &
O’Connell, 1953), as well in conditions involving either object motion or self-motion
(Wallach, Stanton, & Becker, 1974; Rogers & Graham, 1979, 1982).
It should be noted that the concept of a perceptual invariant as characterized in
the ecological approach is not limited to specific sensory modalities, as vision.
Invariants can be both modal and multimodal and depend on proximal information
made available to the agent via the somatosensory and vestibular systems on top of
other sensory modalities. For instance, an important number of studies have tackled
the issue of “dynamic touch”, the ability of the agent to extract invariant properties of
rotational dynamics (the inertia tensor), which may specify objects and body
properties (Carello et al., 2006; Carello & Turvey, 2000; Turvey, 1996).
                                                
7 It should be noted that merely extracting invariant cross ratios cannot explain the perception of
rigidity in complex cases, for which further perceptual information is required (Koenderink, 1986).
8 These invariants are referred to as “first-order differential invariants” of optic flow because their values
are independent of both the choice of the coordinate system and any rotations of the observer around
the projection center. As Koenderink (1986) clarifies: “The [divergence] is a number that specifies the
relative time change of apparent area (solid angle) of a piece of the optic array, the curl is a number
that specifies the rate of rotation, and the [deformation] can be specified with a number (the degree
of shear: always positive) and an orientation (the axis of contraction)”.
9The above examples illustrate the idea according to which perceptual capacities
rely on invariants that the agent can extract from a multimodal array of sensory
information when this sensory information is modulated by motor behavior. To
summarize, we can say that in the ecological approach, a perceptual invariant is a
property of the proximal sensory array that remains unchanged throughout motor
interaction with the environment. It is action-dependent insofar as it can only be
revealed when the sensory stimulation undergoes transformation, which is typically
the result of motor behavior.
2.2 Sensorimotor invariants
The idea that the joint effects of self-initiated movement and sensory stimulation can
provide information to perceptual systems is the core assumption of sensorimotor
approaches to perception. Sensorimotor invariants—often referred to as “sensorimotor
contingencies” (MacKay, 1986; O’Regan & Noë, cit.) or “sensorimotor dependencies”
(Broackes, 2001; Philipona et al. 2003)—are the basic constituents of action-
dependent perceptual information in sensorimotor theories. O’Regan and Noë (cit.),
propose the following informal characterization of sensorimotor contingencies:
[t]he structure of the rules governing the sensory changes produced by various motor
actions, that is, what we call the sensorimotor contingencies governing visual exploration
(p.941).
This definition is quite loose, and in any case not sufficiently constrained to let us
appreciate any significant difference between invariants studied from a sensorimotor
or ecological perspective. A better characterization of a sensorimotor invariant can be
found in the formal definition of “sensorimotor laws” proposed by Philipona et al.
(2004). Their goal is to characterize the invariance governing relations between motor
efference (M) and sensory reafference (S). Given the configuration of the body
(referred to as P) and that of the environment (E), they propose that:
• P and M are connected through a function ϕa: P = ϕa (M)
• S is connected to E in virtue of a function ϕb: S = ϕb (P, E)
The following relation is then introduced as a functional sensorimotor law:
ϕ (M, E) = ϕb (ϕa (M), E)
Although this formal characterization can be challenged on some of its underlying
assumptions9, it is sufficiently explicit to contrast the notion of a sensorimotor
invariant from that of an ecological invariant. Sensorimotor laws constrain the way in
which motor efference and sensory reafference systematically co-vary, as a function of
both the configuration of the body and the structure of the environment. In a given
environment, the body configuration is controlled by the motor outputs in virtue of
ϕa. The sensory organs altogether deliver a multidimensional input that is, in turn, a
function ϕb of the configuration of the body and the configuration of the
environment.
                                                
9 For instance, body configurations need not be uniquely a function of motor states but may also
depend on environmental states (e.g. orientation with respect to gravity).
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Given the existence of these nomological relations in the agent-environment
system, sensorimotor approaches assume that perceptual systems are able to extract
invariant relations between co-occurring sensory and motor patterns. Sensorimotor
invariants are by hypothesis the basic constituents of any kind of information
perceptual systems are able to parse when an organism interacts with the
environment. In this sense, sensorimotor theories endorse the controversial view that
all perceptual information is inherently efference-dependent.
Given these considerations, we can now formulate a sufficiently distinctive
characterization of an action-dependent perceptual invariant from a sensorimotor
perspective. In contrast to ecological approaches, sensorimotor theories do not
characterize perceptual invariants as properties of the sensory stimulation revealed
through motion. A perceptual invariant in a sensorimotor approach is a property of
sensorimotor couplings that remains invariant throughout transformations. Whenever a
sensory transformation co-occurs with a movement, those properties that remain
unchanged in this coupling constitute a sensorimotor invariant. Sensorimotor
invariants are then action-dependent insofar as they describe sensory transformations
matching specific movements and, vice versa, motor transformations matching
specific sensory changes.
2.3 Ecological vs. sensorimotor invariants
As noted in the beginning of our analysis, the radical character of sensorimotor and
ecological approaches does not consist in the claim that action is required in the
perception of one’s own movement, bodily configuration or, more broadly, in
perception targeted at the control of spatial behavior (which is plainly compatible with
mainstream perceptual theories). Rather, the radical claim consists in saying that even
the perception of (supposedly) agent-independent properties (typically: exteroception)
relies on action-dependent information. Our thesis is that radical approaches diverge
in their interpretation of the claim that action pervasively modulates perception, since
they provide substantially different characterizations of what constitutes perceptual
information. In particular, we have shown that ecological and sensorimotor
approaches endorse different notions of perceptual invariants, and, more specifically,
that they make contrasting assumptions on the relation of a perceptual invariant to
the agent’s movement.
We submit that, in an ecological framework, it is not necessary to refer to specific
movements in order to characterize perceptual invariants but only to properties of
sensory patterns that remain invariant across possible transformations. In contrast, in
a sensorimotor framework, invariants are by definition properties of co-occurring
sensory reafference and motor efference. More generally, we can say that movement
has a constitutive role in the determination of sensorimotor invariants, whereas it is
instrumental in the determination of ecological invariants.
Let us try to unpack this idea. From an ecological perspective, properties of the
sensory stimulation that do not change under transformation are taken as perceptual
invariants and as bearers of information about states of the agent-environment
system, in virtue of the ecological laws. Hence, picking up such invariants enables the
observer to perceive a given state, event or property related to the agent, the
environment or their mutual relation. If an ecological invariant is described by specific
11
transformations in the multisensory array, movements of the agent are only required
to produce the sensory transformation with respect to which the invariant is defined.
However, in terms of ecological laws, multiple movements can in principle produce
identical transformations and reveal the same invariants. We then conclude that
ecological invariants are defined in the general case with respect to a specific
transformation, but not to the movements that produce these transformations.
It should be emphasized that the instrumental role of movement in constituting
ecological invariants is not at odds with the fact that they can provide information
about the agent’s body configuration and movements when needed. Perceptual
invariants encompassing, for instance, somatosensory and kinesthetic stimulation can
specify proprioceptive exproprioceptive and/or exteroceptive information (the
literature about dynamic touch we mentioned before is particularly relevant here).
However, from the fact that these sensory sources can provide agent-related
information, it does not follow that the underlying invariants encode movements
(and, in particular, efference) as constitutive variables10.
Consistently with the idea of the instrumental role of movement, the ecological
approach admits the possibility that, in many perceptual conditions where
information about the agent’s movements or body configuration is not necessary
(typically, in cases of exteroceptive perception), invariants not encompassing agent-
related variables could provide sufficient information to accomplish the perceptual
task. As we will clarify in the following sections, distinguishing between the
constitutive role of movement in invariants and the fact that sensory invariants can
inform the agent about its own movements has crucial implications on the explanatory
strategy of the two approaches.
The idea of the instrumental role of movement in ecological approaches can be
exemplified by considering the two cases of perceptual invariants described above.
The cross ratio is invariant under different transformations affecting either the
viewpoint X or the object in the environment (L1). This means that, in real-world
situations, the same invariant would be revealed either by active movements of the
perceiver around a rigid stationary object or by a moving object for a static observer.
Even if we consider active movements of the perceiver, the same invariant can be
revealed either by the active manipulation of the object by the perceiver or by an active
displacement of his viewpoint. Since what matters from an ecological perspective is
the informative relation between the perceptual invariant (e.g., the cross ratio) and the
specified property of the distal object (e.g., rigidity), the specific motor patterns
producing the sensory transformation do not contribute to the characterization of the
invariant.
Similarly, what specifies motion parallax as an invariant is a transformation that
underdetermines the class of possible movements that produce it. In order for parallax
to be revealed, the relevant sensory transformation has to occur, but it makes no
difference, in terms of the availability of the information, if the invariant is revealed by
an active movement of the observer, by a passive movement of the observer, or by a
movement of the object in the environment.
                                                
10 Incidentally, different sources of motor-dependent information can fail to uniquely specify the state
of the agent, see for example the discussion about input conflicts in Stoffregen & Bardy (2001).
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In contrast, according to a sensorimotor approach, when actively exploring the
environment an organism is exposed to dynamic sensorimotor couplings, which
possess properties invariant under transformations affecting various efferent motor
and reafferent sensory variables. For instance, invariant relations can be described
between a rotation of the head on the one hand and the co-occurring patterns of
retinal and proprioceptive stimulation on the other hand. These sensorimotor
relations remain invariant under transformations affecting sensory or motor
parameters (i.e., changes in rotation velocity, changes in initial conditions, variations
in stimulus configuration, or intensity). The perceiver is able by hypothesis to identify
sensorimotor invariants over several occurrences of sensorimotor couplings.
We can summarize these conclusions by saying that these two characterizations of
the notion of action-dependent perceptual invariants put different constraints on the
kind of information an organism is supposedly able to extract and to process. In the
case of sensorimotor approaches, the organism is supposed to be able of extracting
motor-specific information whereas in the case of ecological theories the organism
must be able to extract transformation-specific information.
2.4 Motor dependence vs. action dependence
Are we entitled to conclude that ecological invariants, given their instrumental
relation with movement, are not action-dependent? This claim may sound
counterintuitive, since the fundamental assumption of the ecological approach is
admittedly that perceptual information is only available to agents actively exploring
their environment. Perceptual information is available to agents in terms of
affordances, i.e. it specifies “possibilities for action” (Gibson, cit.; Withagen &
Michaels, 2004). Invariants specify information only to animals engaging in actions
and in this sense information provided by invariants has been considered as
constitutively action-dependent (Gibson, 1979; Reed, 1996; Warren, 2006b). As
Michaels and Carello (cit.) observe:
[e]nergy patterns that are invariant with respect to relevant transformations and that
specify the environment are not, by themselves, equivalent to information; the animal
must be specified. Moreover, even a complete inventory of those invariant structures must
be based on an equally complete inventory of the consequences of each of the exploratory
(and performatory) activities in which an animal can engage (p.39).
How can we accommodate our claim of the instrumental role of motion in ecological
approaches with the claim that action is constitutive of perceptual information
according to defendants of ecological theories? The solution, we argue, is that in the
ecological approach the term “action” refers to adaptive, goal-directed behavior
(Gibson, cit.; Reed, cit.). By picking up perceptual invariants, organisms perceive
affordances that mediate adaptive control of behavior. In ecological terms then, the
radical claim that information is “constitutively action-dependent” means that animals
perceive affordances in the environment that allow them to attain specific goals.11
                                                
11 As Warren (2006b) puts it: “Alongside the dynamical approach to movement there developed the
ecological perception–action approach to the control of behavior (Gibson, 1958/1998, 1979; Lee,
1976, 1980; Shaw, Kugler, & Kinsella-Shaw, 1990; Turvey & Carello, 1986; Warren, 1988, 1998).
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Information in terms of affordances is in this sense targeted to specific actions, but
the invariants (whose pickup reveals an affordance) do not depend, as we argued, on
specific movements. As Reed puts it:
[i]nformation is specific to the ecological task of the animal. It is not specific to
mechanisms or to processes within the animal, nor is it purely external unrelated to the
organism (Reed, 1996, p. 57).12
Ecological approaches can then at the same time defend a broad idea of action
dependence of information (i.e. its specificity to the task) without discarding the idea
of the instrumentality of movement at the level of perceptual invariants. As Withagen
& Michaels (2004) point out, Gibson (1966)’s concept of a “perceptual system” as
well as Reed (1982)’s concept of an “action system” assume the functional dependence
of action and perception at the level of goal-directed behavior. The same information
can be “captured” by different perceptual systems which may physically vary, and
cannot be described with reference to specific anatomical structures (Reed, 1986).
The instrumental role of movement in the definition of invariants appears to be
perfectly consistent with this theoretical stance: ecological psychologists refer to this
idea as “motor equivalence”. The ecological approach insists on the idea that
perceptual systems are able to exploit information which is invariant over variations of
body configuration, movements and even anatomical structure. This capacity has an
adaptive value, to the extent that it enables agents to obtain equivalent information
under different conditions. Again, emphasizing the idea of motor equivalence does
not conflict with the fact that ambient arrays may provide invariants specifying
proprioceptive and exteroceptive information. Rather, it implies that agent-related
information will only be used when relevant with respect to the perceptual task, but
neglected when irrelevant, consistently with the idea of the adaptive value of motor
equivalence.
To conclude, if we take action to mean “goal-directed motor behavior”, then we
can say that the sensorimotor approach shares with the ecological approach the
assumption that information is action-dependent in a loose sense.13 However, we
argued that sensorimotor and ecological theories make contrasting assumptions on the
nature of perceptual invariants that constitute information for the agent. Albeit
loosely “action-dependent” in both cases, we suggested that perceptual information is
characterized as motor-specific  in the case of sensorimotor invariants and
transformation-specific (and motor-equivalent with respect to movement) in the case of
                                                                                                                                     
This view emphasizes the role of occurrent information in guiding behavior, in the form of optic,
acoustic, haptic, or olfactory fields that are structured by and are specific to the state of the agent-
environment system. The research program involves determining what informational quantities
govern naturalistic behaviors like reaching, catching, hitting, standing posture, or locomotion”.
12 By taking the classical example of τ (Lee, 1980), Reed explains that “The hummingbird’s ability to
maintain τ>0.5 is an ability to dock with a slight closing velocity. Bats also seem to control
locomotion by monitoring τ. Despite the radical difference in mechanisms (vision versus
echolocation, bird versus bat flight patterns), these animals are accomplishing the same thing” (Reed,
1996, page 57).
13 “Enactive knowledge depends upon an action-perception cycle. Action reveals information, which
guides further action, which reveals additional information, and so on” (Stoffregen & Bardy, 2004).
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ecological invariants.
This distinction between action dependence and motor dependence has been
underestimated so far in the literature. Part of the major theoretical divergence
between enactive and ecological theories (in particular their different view of agents as
shaping the perceptual environment through action vs. agents simply exploring the
perceptual environment through action) should actually be reconsidered in the light of
this technical distinction about the underlying notion of perceptual information.14
We submit, though, that this distinction is useful not only to distinguish the
ecological and sensorimotor approach at a theoretical level, but also to disentangle
different empirical predictions that depend on this distinction and that the literature
has not yet fully acknowledged.
3 Motor specificity: empirical predictions of the sensorimotor
hypothesis
If—as sensorimotor theories assume—perception is motor-dependent insofar as it
systematically relies on information that ties sensory reafference to specific classes of
motor efference (and not only to motor-induced sensory transformations), then we
should expect a substantial divergence in the empirical predictions made by ecological
and sensorimotor theories.
The question of the empirical validation of these approaches reveals a major
asymmetry between the sensorimotor and the ecological theory. On the one hand, the
ecological approach to perception can be seen as a full-fledged scientific theory, which
has received in four decades of investigations substantial empirical support15.
Ecological psychologists have developed detailed descriptions of how perceptual
systems exploit different sources of information available in the ambient arrays for the
adaptive control of behavior. On the other hand, as we already pointed out, the
sensorimotor approach has not yet been translated into an empirical research
programme, and has been criticized precisely for the lack of empirical evidence in
support of its core assumption (Scholl & Simons, 2001). In particular, the thesis of
the constitutive and pervasive role of movement in perception appears to be an
extremely strong claim, which, as many have suggested, might be trivially refuted by
cases in which accurate perceptual performance can occur with no motor contribution
of the agent (Prinz, 2006). The ecological perspective, by putting forward the idea
that perceptual information is motor equivalent, seems to be offer a more plausible
account of how to characterize the relations between action and perception.
Moreover, one may argue that, even if the theoretical distinction between the
constitutive and instrumental role of movement in defining perceptual invariants
holds, this makes virtually no difference between the two approaches, to the extent
that “constitutively” motor-equivalent invariants may specify, when needed, agent-
related (e.g. proprioceptive and exproprioceptive) information. Hence, the ecological
approach can account for all perceptual tasks that require a reference to the agent’s
                                                
14  See also Varela et al., 1991, pp. 203-204 for a similar conclusion.
15 A representative bibliography of the theoretical and experimental work produced by the ecological
approach can be found here: http://ione.psy.uconn.edu/publications.html
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self-motion, without postulating the pervasiveness of efference-dependent
information.
In this section, we address the issue of the empirical basis by reviewing evidence
from the experimental literature in which encoding motion specificity seems to be a
key to the explanation of a number of perceptual capabilities. The logic of this section
consists in showing that there seems to be cases in which motor specificity plays a role
in modulating perceptual judgments even if it does not provide additional information
which is relevant for the task. In other words, there are conditions in which efference-
specific information seems to be required not only to perform proprioceptive and
exproprioceptive tasks targeted at the control of motor behavior (in which case the
ecological and sensorimotor approach would make similar predictions), but also in the
case of exteroceptive judgments where movement should not in principle contribute to
further specify the property or state to be perceived. These examples are not meant to
be a rebuttal of the ecological thesis of the functional equivalence of motor
mechanisms, which has already received substantial empirical support (see section 2.1
above). Rather, our aim is to suggest that the sensorimotor notion of motor specificity
should be carefully distinguished from that of motor specificity since the former could
be in a better position than the latter to account for some specific classes of perceptual
abilities.
3.1 Active vs. passive perception
The first set of experimental results we review are those contrasting the performance
of immobile vs. moving observers when they engage in perceptual tasks involving
identical sensory configurations.
Perceptual substitution
Perceptual substitution is a manipulation that allows to transform stimuli in a given
sensory modality (e.g. vision) into stimuli of another sensory modality (e.g. touch). A
perceptual substitution device consists of three parts: a sensor allowing the conversion
of a form of energy (stimuli from sensory modality A) into signals interpretable by a
coupling system, responsible of the coordinated activation of a stimulator into sensory
modality B. The goal of protocols using perceptual substitution devices consists in
measuring to what extent perceptual systems are able to correctly process information
independently of the modal coding in which the senses present it.
Experimental results obtained by perceptual substitution protocols (Bach-y-Rita,
1972; Barfield & Furness, 1995; Lenay, 1997; Gonzales & Bach-y-Rita, 2003)
support the claim that perceptual processing required to solve these tasks rely on the
availability of efferent information. Particular emphasis has been put on the fact that
efficient perceptual substitution only occurs if subjects are allowed to engage in
sensorimotor interaction with the object, whereas no perception arises if dynamical
sensory stimulation is passively received and processed by the subject (White, 1970;
Lenay 2003; Sampaio, 1995). The interesting point is that, when subjects are allowed
to actively interact with the object, in many cases motor patterns do not reveal
subject-related sensory stimulation, which would provide additional relevant
information for accomplishing the task. To consistently account for these cases, the
ecological approach should show that 1) only the active conditions provide adequate
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information to the subject and 2) in the active conditions there is motor equivalence16.
Otherwise, from an ecological perspective one could expect a similar performance in
both cases, since the relevant invariants produced during the transformation of the
stimuli are supposedly the same in the active and passive conditions. In contrast, the
sensorimotor approach straightforwardly predicts a different performance in the two
conditions, assuming that the observer, in the passive condition is not engaging in any
kind of sensorimotor coupling, and as a consequence no perceptual invariants can be
extracted in this condition.
Structure-from-motion
In contrast with the results discussed in section 2.1, which support the hypothesis of
motor equivalence, several studies have shown that subjects process identical visual
configurations in different ways, depending whether they actively produce the
transformation in the visual stimulation or they passively process it (see Wexler &
Van Boxtel, 2005 for a comprehensive review). There is growing evidence that the
perception of depth and object shape from motion parallax considerably varies
depending on whether the observer is allowed to move or not (Wexler et al., 2001a;
Wexler et al., 2001b; van Boxtel et al., 2003). Typical test conditions are those in
which subjects are asked to disambiguate a 3D optic flow simulated on a computer
monitor. The optic flow is presented in such a way that the same ambiguous
configurations are present when subjects passively experience the stimuli or when they
are allowed to move towards the object. Wexler et al. (2001a) show that subjects
provide different interpretations of the stimuli in the passive and active conditions,
despite the fact that they are exposed to the very same visual sensory transformations.
Several hypotheses have been proposed to account for the reason why the perception
of the very same visual configuration varies when the subject is moving (Wolpert &
Flanagan, 2001). All of these hypotheses require that the agent be capable of
predicting the correlation between specific efferent patterns and specific sensory
transformations. The difference between the two conditions cannot be explained
solely by referring to sensory transformations (Gibson, 1950; Findlay & Gilchrist
2003). Again, the fact of perceiving differently an identical optic flow seems to be at
odds with the ecological assumption of motor equivalence, since in this case self-
motion does not reveal additional information supposed to be relevant for the
perceptual task. Conversely, if the difference in performance is due to different ways
of processing sensorimotor couplings, then sensorimotor invariants seem to be the
relevant structures that agents are extracting.
A defendant of the ecological approach may also reply that all these experimental
protocols comparing active vs. passive conditions do not provide any evidence
specifically in favor of the sensorimotor hypothesis, since the ecological approach
would equally predict that, as far as in one condition the perceiver is not actively
                                                
16 For instance, Warren (2006a) reports evidence that depth perception in sensory substitution is not
motor specific, since it would transfer from one arm to the other as well as to novel joint angles. He
suggests that this is evidence of a perception-action invariant relevant for sensory substitution that is
not motor-specific.
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exploring the environment, his performance will trivially be different from the active
condition. Passive conditions, as it were, do not provide information in terms of
affordances because there is no goal-directed behavior. However, insofar as the
observer can make distinct perceptual judgments, we argue that it is legitimate to
consider information provided by the simulated optical flow as “affordance” in a
genuine ecological meaning. The fact the perceiver is not actively moving should
make no difference if motor patterns coupled with the sensory stimulation were
irrelevant to the task.
3.2 Perception in active vs. passive self-motion
A second set of experimental results consistent with the hypothesis of motor
specificity of perceptual invariants are those suggesting that subjects perceive
differently identical dynamic visual configurations whether their movement is self-
generated (“voluntary”) or passively imposed.  For instance, it is know for a long time
that perceptual adaptation to prismatic distortions is much more efficient in
conditions where movement is self-generated than in conditions where participants
are passively moved on a trolley or in a wheelchair (Held, 1965). Analogously, active
self-motion has been shown to improve heading judgments when compared to passive
self-motion (Telford et al., 1995).
Wexler (2003) compares a control condition in which subjects experience an
ambiguous dynamical configuration (which can be interpreted as stationary either in
an allocentric frame of reference, or in an egocentric frame of reference) when
engaging in self-generated head movements with a condition in which subjects have
their head blocked and are passively displaced on a wheelchair by the experimenter.
With respect to the active/passive comparison, in this case subjects are able to move
their head in both conditions, which provides them with additional proprioceptive
information. The results show a significant difference in the interpretation of the
visual configuration in the two conditions: subjects display a systematic preference for
the allocentric stationary interpretation when head movements are self-generated.
Crucially, Wexler shows in the same study that perceptual performance changes not
only as a function of the active or passive character of self-motion, but also of the
specific kind of active movement performed by the subject. Subjects presented with an
identical visual pattern are asked to perform the same task of stimulus disambiguation
either by freely moving their head or by actively moving the wheelchair without the
possibility of moving their head. In this case, results show that the interpretation of
the visual stimuli was significantly different. Whereas subjects preferred again an
allocentric interpretation when allowed to actively move their head, they
systematically preferred an egocentric interpretation when forced to move the
wheelchair, thus showing the determinant role of the specific motion scheme in
modulating perceptual judgments.
The standard account for these results is that subjects perform differently in the
two conditions because active self-motion provides additional extra-retinal
information with respect to passive self-motion. In particular, efferent copies are
assumed to enable sensorimotor predictions—i.e. anticipations of sensory effects
resulting from specific movements—which may be used to constrain perceptual
judgments through the comparison between expected reafference and actual
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sensations (Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001; Blakemore et al., 1999). In the specific case of
ambiguous configurations discussed, sensorimotor prediction may be used to
constrain the possible interpretations of the visual configuration (Wexler & Van
Boxtel, 2005). As Wexler emphasizes, the hypothesis of sensorimotor predictions is
consistent with the fact that the perceptual performance varies following the specific
motor scheme in which the subject is engaged.
Evidence on the contribution of voluntary self-motion to perception represents a
second example of empirical results supporting the idea that ecological invariants that
postulate motor dependence cannot per se account for cases in which different motion
patterns coupled with the same sensory stimulation result in difference in
performance. Sensorimotor theories would argue that the difference in the two
conditions is due to the use of distinct types of underlying motor-specific invariants,
whereas ecological theories would need to justify the appeal to proprioceptive
information as a necessary integration to disambiguate identical transformational
invariants.
3.3 Can motor-specific perceptual invariants shed light on
action/perception relations?
The results shortly reviewed in this section suggest that in several conditions only by
assuming that subjects are able to parse the specific movements in which they engage
when involved in a perceptual task, it is possible to adequately account for major
differences in perceptual performance. Whether motor specificity can be extracted
simply in virtue of underlying invariants or requires the integration of a proprioceptive
judgment based on non motor-specific information is an issue that require further
empirical investigation. These cases are meant to illustrate that theories endorsing
different notion of action-dependent perceptual invariants can be contrasted not only
at a conceptual level but also in terms of the different empirical predictions they
formulate on specific perceptual tasks. Of course, these results do not provide
compelling evidence that perceptual systems, when negotiating stimulus
interpretation through action, always rely on motor-specific strategies. Quite on the
contrary, the ecological hypothesis of functional equivalence of motor patterns is well
established and has received broad empirical support, which is in fact at odds with the
predictions of sensorimotor theories. What this empirical evidence suggests is that the
question of understanding to what extent action modulates perceptual processing
cannot be settled without a thorough understanding of the structure of perceptual
information mediated by action. For instance, an advocate of the ecological approach
may argue that these results simply suggest that, as far as the agent behaves in more
“ecologically-valid” conditions, agent-related information provided by self-motion can
contribute to exteroception in a broad range of conditions. However, it seems that
this general interpretation would significantly weaken (if not undermine) the
importance of the functional equivalence hypothesis, which is a distinctive and well-
established feature of perceptual systems according to the ecological approach.
4 Conclusions
The aim of the present analysis was to frame the notion of action-dependent
perceptual invariants—a notion that is central to controversial claims of the
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pervasiveness of action in the functioning of human perception. By taking a radical
stance on the functional role of action in perception, ecological and sensorimotor
theories are often considered as similar and mutually reducible theories. We argued
that, in spite of a number of shared background assumptions, ecological and
sensorimotor approaches to perception make substantially different predictions on the
nature of perceptual information.
We showed in particular that ecological theories conceive invariants as properties
of the sensory stimulation that remain constant through transformation produced by
the perceiver’s self-motion, but in which the actual movement generating the
transformation is extrinsic to the characterization of the invariant. Ecological
invariants are transformation-specific, but they do not rely on the extraction of specific
motor schemes: whatever motor scheme produces a transformation in the ambient
array, only the transformation is relevant to specify the perceptual invariant. In
contrast, sensorimotor approaches postulate that perceptual systems build invariants
by extracting regularities from co-occurring efferent motor and reafferent sensory
patterns. In this case, the perceptual system is supposed to be able to represent
invariances that are motor-specific, insofar as properties of motor schemes are intrinsic
constituents of perceptual invariants.
This distinction allows us to drive a wedge between theories that attribute an
instrumental role to self-motion in the specification of invariants and theories taking
self-motion as constitutive to the specification of an invariant. Far from being a purely
conceptual distinction, we suggested that this difference results in diverging empirical
predictions about perceptual capabilities mediated by action. Whether an observer is
extracting regularities of her own motor schemes, has substantial consequences on
how perceptual judgments are affected by motor information.
Advocates of the ecological and sensorimotor approaches may still object that
there is no conceptual incompatibility between the hypotheses of motor equivalence
and motor specificity. Hence, each approach could easily accommodate both hypotheses
in its own framework. The ecological approach could (a) include efferent information
in the characterization of the global energetic array or (b) appeal to the contribution
of proprioception to account for cases in which simple transformational invariants are
insufficient to ground perceptual distinctions. Conversely, the sensorimotor approach
may admit that (a) certain kinds of perceptual abilities need just rely on
transformation-dependent information or it may even accept that (2) the organism
must abstract from motor specificity for certain classes of perceptual judgments to be
possible. In this case the ecological and the sensorimotor approaches would effectively
reduce to the same theory. Nevertheless, such unification does not come for free. If
action dependence in perception can alternatively be motor-equivalent or motor-
specific, the theory will need to provide predictions on those conditions in which
action modulates perception in a motor-specific way (e.g. by relying on efference-
related information) as opposed to conditions in which this modulation is
transformation-specific. Otherwise, the resulting theory, by simply encompassing two
alternative hypotheses, would loose the predictive power (and empirical refutability)
of the original theories.
In conclusion, there is relevant empirical support to the thesis that several
perceptual capabilities are modulated by action-dependent information, as predicted
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by defendants of radical theories of action/perception relations. We suggested that
further research directions will need to provide more constrained hypotheses on what
it means for perceptual information to be action-dependent. This requires in
particular accounting for conditions in which action modulates perception in a motor-
specific way as opposed to conditions in which this modulation is transformation-
specific.
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